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The National Popular Vote (NPV) interstate compact proposes to change the presidential election
system from a state-based federal system to a national popular vote system. NPV proponents

contend states can implement the compact without federal governmental authorization.
This article addresses the constitutional questions of whether the NPV must obtain Congress's

approval and whether Congress has the constitutional authority to grant such approval. In
addressing these questions, I review U.S. Supreme Court precedents and constitutional history
and find the NPV is the type of compact the Supreme Court would conclude requires congressio

nal approval. Most importantly, I contend Congress is constitutionally unable to grant approval
of this compact and the Supreme Court will play an integral role in making this determination.

The National Popular Vote (NPV) plan is an interstate compact that seeks to create

a popular vote-based system of presidential election. It is expressly intended to
circumvent the purported deficiency of the Electoral College system: allocating
electoral votes to the winner of the popular vote within the state.1 The Electoral
College has been the subject of more constitutional amendment proposals than any

other (Hardaway 1994). The NPV proponents have echoed earlier complaints,
contending voters in two-thirds of the states are "effectively disenfranchised," the

Electoral College does not produce a "reliable reflection" of the national popular

vote, and votes are not weighted equally throughout the nation. In short, NPV
supporters believe the NPV compact will more accurately reflect actual voters'
preferences (Koza et al. 2013). The NPV compact will become effective for each

state that has enacted the compact when the "states cumulatively possessing a
majority of the total electoral votes have ratified the compact" (California Election

Code 2012). To date, the nine enacting states (California, Hawaii, Illinois,
Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey, Rhode Island, Washington, and Vermont)

and Washington, D.C., possess 136 of the 270 votes needed to win the Electoral
College vote. The NPV proponents rightly claim they are almost "halfway" to their

goal (National Popular Vote 2013). If the NPV is implemented it would likely
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dramatically alter the conduct and outcome of presidential elections. Accordingly,

this compact presents a direct challenge to a fundamental federal institution

(National Popular Vote 2013).
This article does not address the wisdom of the NPV as public policy; rather, it
seeks to reveal the constitutional barriers facing the NPV through an analysis of

historical and legal precedents. Most importantly, this article is concerned with

state and federal governmental powers within the context of a constitutional
institution, the Electoral College. The NPV plan has been the subject of multiple
critiques by supporters and opponents (Brody 2013; Bennett 2001; Williams 2011;
Amar 2011; Amar and Amar 2001; Muller 2007). The history of the plan's origins
and course of enactment have been thoroughly documented (Green 2012). As will

be discussed below, NPV proponents contend the Supreme Court's interpretation

of the Compact Clause of Article I, Section 10 of the Constitution allows for
interstate compacts like the NPV to be enacted and implemented by states without

congressional approval (National Popular Vote 2013; Brody 2013).

The Scholarly Debate regarding the NPV Compact
The interstate compact method of altering the Electoral College has obvious appeal
to its proponents who feel that adoption of the compact is easier to achieve than
enactment of a constitutional amendment. A constitutional amendment would

require not only approval by supermajorities in both houses of Congress, but also

would need to be ratified by thirty-eight state legislatures. By comparison, the

NPV's terms require that participating states implement the law once states
cumulatively possessing 270 electoral votes have enacted the NPV. This could
theoretically be as few as the eleven most populous states (Amar and Amar 2001).

Some critics have challenged the political prudence of the NPV. For example,
Norman R. Williams has contended the NPV is "an invitation to constitutional

crisis and unending, politically motivated litigation" (Williams 2011). Williams

contends the NPV likely violates the Equal Protection clause of the
14th Amendment since states would be obliged to count votes cast in other
states under other states' registration and recount standards. Others have claimed
the NPV violates the Guarantee Clause because it eliminates the role of the states in
selecting the president, legitimates states legislating for other states, and creates the

threat of a minority-bloc deciding the presidency (Feeley 2009), or violates the
Compact Clause because it benefits member states to the detriment of nonmember
states and interferes with a federal interest or institution (Green 2012; Muller 2007,

2012). One scholar has argued the NPV violates Voting Rights Act of 1965 by
diluting minorities' ability to select the candidate of their choice (Gringer 2008).

In this article, I add a new element to the debate concerning the NPV. I build

on constitutional arguments regarding the Compact Clause, but go further by
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emphasizing the importance of the Supreme Court's role in interpreting compacts

and the limits of Congress's power in approving compacts. The uniquely federal
structure of the Electoral College is key to evaluating the NPV's constitutionality.

The next section addresses the constitutional status of the NPV in light of the

Compact Clause. The third section addresses the constitutional propriety of
congressional approval of the NPV. It is my contention that, although not all
interstate compacts require congressional approval, the NPV's distinct federal
character and goals are dramatically different than any prior interstate compact.

Accordingly, I contend that (1) states must submit the NPV to Congress and

(2) Congress must approve the NPV in order for it to be constitutionally
implemented. Therefore, implementation of the NPV by its member states without
submission to Congress or congressional approval would be unconstitutional under

the Compact Clause. Additionally, and most importantly, in the third section
I argue that even if the NPV were submitted to Congress, as is required by the

Compact Clause, it would be an unconstitutional act by Congress to approve
the NPV. This latter contention is the most original contribution I make to the
increasingly lengthy debate regarding the NPV.

I argue that Congress cannot approve the NPV because (1) the Constitution
allows only states to decide the manner in which electors are selected and (2) the

Constitution creates and mandates the Electoral College as an institution of the
federal government, which Congress cannot simply sidestep or effectively abolish by

statutory enactment. In short, I contend that Congress cannot execute via the

Compact Clause what it could not do through a regular statutory enactment:
eviscerate the Electoral College and replace it with a national popular vote system

of presidential selection. My argument suggests NPV proponents appear to be
caught in a catch-22 problem (Heller 1985): The Compact Clause requires the NPV

to be submitted to Congress for approval, but Congress cannot constitutionally
approve the compact. Accordingly, the only route left to NPV proponents is to
change the Constitution pursuant to the amendment process of Article V.

The NPV and Compact Clause
Article I, Section 10 of the Constitution provides: "No State shall, without the
consent of Congress... enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State."
This is popularly referred to as the Compact Clause. The constitutional meaning of
the term "compact" has never been precise and the Supreme Court has shaped the
clause's interpretation. The original purpose of the Compact Clause appears to have

been resolving inter-colonial boundary disputes (Zimmerman 2012). However,
"compact" was included in the final constitutional draft without apparent
discussion (Hollis 2010). Accordingly, it was left up to the federal government to

interpret the clause, a task taken on by the Supreme Court, which has greatly
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shaped the modern meaning of the clause (Broun et al. 2006). As the Court has
defined the clause, states can form a compact on any matter that does not increase

the political power of one state or multiple states over other states and thereby

"encroach... upon the full and free exercise of federal authority" ( Virginia v.
Tennessee [1893]).
The Virginia v. Tennessee definition has remained the lodestar for determining

whether an interstate agreement is within the Compact Clause. In the latter
twentieth century, interstate compacts became tools for resolving or managing
regional and national issues that were " 'supra-state, sub-federal' in nature" (Broun

et al. 2006). These multilateral compacts dealt with matters ranging from crime

control (e.g., Interstate Compact for Adult Offender Supervision) to waste
management (e.g., Ohio River Valley Sanitation Compact), and from urban issues

(e.g., New York—New Jersey Port Authority Compact) to education (e.g.,
Midwestern Regional Higher Education Compact). As of June 1, 2011, Congress
had approved 176 interstate compacts, although not all of these are currently active
(Zimmerman 2012). Yet none of these was on the order of the NPV compact that
seeks to fundamentally alter the Electoral College, an institution established by the

Constitution. Federal authority remains unchallenged by the existing roster of
compacts. Even for those compacts that potentially intrude upon federal Commerce

Clause power or another power, such as extradition law, Congress's approval of a
compact is construed as acting within a constitutionally enumerated power (Broun
et al. 2006, citing California v. Superior Court of California [1987] and Intake Water
Company v. Yellowstone River Compact Commission [1983]). Also, the states are not

entitled to congressional consent; rather the Court views Congress's consent as a

"gratuity" (Broun et al. 2006, citing College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid
Postsecondary Education Expense Board [1999]).
The Constitutional Character of the NPV

Opponents and proponents agree that the NPV is an interstate "Agreement or
Compact" within the Compact Clause (National Popular Vote 2013; Zimmerman
2012; Muller 2007). The contingency clause, stipulating that the NPV only takes
effect once a sufficient number of states have enacted the law in order to reach the

compact's specified goals, is common to many existing interstate agreements or

compacts (Zimmerman 2012). For example, the Tri-State Lotto Compact, which
created a multistate lottery to raise revenue for each participating state, only went

into effect if Maine, New Hampshire, and Vermont enacted the law (Koza et al.

2013). As the U.S. Supreme Court stated in 1893, an "agreement or compact" is
formed when it "recites some consideration for it from the other party affected by

it; for example, as made upon a similar declaration of the border or contracting

state. The mutual declarations may then be reasonably treated as made upon

mutual considerations" (Virginia v. Tennessee [1893]). Thus, the NPV's
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contingency clause ("mutual declaration") supports the conclusion it falls within

the Compact Clause.
The need for contingent implementation is premised upon the difficulty of

achieving collective action goals. An effort by one state to allocate its votes
according to the national popular vote, without any guarantee other states would

follow suit, would be a virtual "unilateral disarmament" (Amar and Amar 2001).
Accordingly, only a collective effort, whereby states are assured their electoral votes

will be awarded to the national popular vote winner and that such winner will be

the Electoral College winner, too, will be a plausible, practical resolution to the
collective action dilemma.

In order to adjudge the constitutionality of the NPV, the Framers' intentions
regarding the establishment of the Electoral College in the Constitution must be

understood. As scholars have noted, the Electoral College is a mal-apportioned
manner of electing the president, but it reflects the federal structure of the Union

(Williams 2011). The character of the Electoral College is a reflection of historically
rooted concerns regarding the nature of large republics and the federal structure of the

Union at the time of the proposal of the Constitution in 1787. In Spirit of the Laws
(1748), Baron De Montesquieu argued republics were best suited to small territories
because "the interest of the public is more obvious, better understood, and more
within the reach of every citizen" (Montesquieu 1949). Alexander Hamilton claimed

the state-allocated electors would be those "most capable of analizing [sic] the
qualities adapted to the station" and "most likely to possess the information and
discernment" needed for deciding the presidency (Hamilton 1961).

The Electoral College also reflects the federal character of the Union. The
number of electors is correlative to the number of senators and representatives in
each state and the states decide how the electors are selected. These facts alone

make the power each state wields in selecting the president a power, or influence,
uniquely correlated to the federal system, wherein institutions are premised upon
the participation of states as governing entities.
Is Congressional Approval of the NPV Compact Required Under the Compact
Clause?

NPV proponents contend congressional approval of the NPV compact is not
required. This claim illustrates the important role that the U.S. Supreme Court will
likely play in any resolution of the NPV's legitimacy. Proponents rely on Virginia v.

Tennessee (1893), involving a boundary resolution compact between Virginia and
Tennessee that lacked formal congressional approval ( Virginia v. Tennessee [1893]).
After the U.S. Constitution was ratified, North Carolina ceded territory that became

the state of Tennessee in 1796 (Powell 1989). Thereafter, Tennessee and Virginia

appointed commissioners to settle the boundary and by 1803 both states had
enacted laws that ratified their agreement on the boundary.
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The U.S. Supreme Court had original jurisdiction over the dispute and in 1893

the Court heard Virginia's complaint to set aside the decades-old boundary
agreement. In a unanimous opinion authored by Justice Stephen Field the Court
held that the interstate compact was valid, notwithstanding lack of congressional
approval. In upholding the boundary agreement, the Court defined "Agreement or

Compact," which comprises:
all forms of stipulation, written or verbal, and relating to all kinds of subjects;

to those to which the United States can have no possible objection or have
any interest in interfering with, as well as to those which may tend to increase

and build up the political influence of the contracting States, so as to
encroach upon or impair the supremacy of the United States or interfere with

their rightful management of particular subjects placed under their entire

control (Virginia v. Tennessee [1893]).

The Court reasoned that the Compact Clause did "not apply to every possible
compact or agreement" because some compacts, such as agreements to transport
materials along interstate waterways or to drain a disease-ridden swamp straddling
state borders, "in no respect concern the United States." The Court, citing former
Justice Joseph Story's interpretation of the Compact Clause in his Commentaries on

the Constitution of the United States (1833), stated the clause requires congressional

approval for compacts that produce an "increase of political power in the States,

which may encroach upon or interfere with the just supremacy of the United

States." The Court approved Justice Story's conclusion that congressional
authorization was required for agreements "of a political character; such
as... treaties of confederation, in which the parties are leagued for mutual
government, political cooperation, and the exercise of political sovereignty, and
treaties of cession of sovereignty, or conferring internal political jurisdiction, or
external political dependence, or general commercial privileges."

The Court established a two-step inquiry for whether an interstate compact
needs congressional approval: ( 1 ) Whether the compact increases the power of the

compact member states vis-à-vis the nonmember states and (2) whether the
compact alters or interferes with the "full and free exercise" of a federal function
or authority (Virginia v. Tennessee [1893]). This standard allows Congress to fulfill
the purpose of what Joseph F. Zimmerman has termed "protecting] the Union by

controlling collective actions of the states" (Zimmerman 1996). The consent
requirement makes Congress "a counterweight against potentially harmful
collective state action that could erode the viability and sovereignty of the national

government" (Broun et al. 2006).
Proponents of the NPV have stipulated "congressional consent provides a means

of protecting the federal government from efforts by the states to encroach
upon... federal supremacy." However, the proponents, citing Virginia v. Tennessee,
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claim congressional approval is unnecessary because states' political power would

allegedly remain unaffected and the NPV would not encroach upon federal
authority (Koza et al. 2013). Even Joseph F. Zimmerman, author of a scholarly
monograph on interstate agreements and a coauthor of the leading text supporting

the NPV, has claimed the NPV is an "innovative" proposal that does not require
Congress's consent (Zimmerman 2012).
Comparative Enhancement of State Power

Yet the NPV would impinge upon both of the Court's concerns in Virginia v.
Tennessee (1893) and therefore must be submitted to Congress. First, the NPV

would enhance the power of member states vis-à-vis nonmember states. The
member states will be participating in a system that mandates the member states'

electoral votes will be allocated to the national popular vote winner. These states
will be the de facto group that actually elects the president, since the total number

of electoral votes allocated under the NPV system totals at least the 270 votes
needed to win the Electoral College. Thus, the NPV compact "tend[s] to increase
and build up the political influence of the contracting States" in relation to the
non-contracting states ( Virginia v. Tennessee [1893]). Simply put, the NPV compact
is a new political arrangement, with the political power of the contracting states

increased in opposition to the nonmember states in regard to selection of the
president (Muller 2007).
States that do not enact the NPV, of course, will remain free to allocate their
electors as they so choose (McPherson v. Blacker [1892]). Invariably some member
states will find their electoral votes are allocated to a candidate that failed to win

the popular vote within the state (Bennett 2001). Also, some states that are
competitive under the current winner-take-all- within-the-state system will no longer

retain their political importance to presidential candidates in a national popular
vote system.
Federalism Concerns

Not only does the NPV enhance member states' power in comparison to the
nonmember states, but it also impacts the second concern of the Supreme Court in

Virginia v. Tennessee (1893): "encroaching] ...upon the full and free exercise of
federal authority." In 1949, Congress approved a compact that created a bridge

commission between Missouri and Tennessee, which allowed for bridges to be
constructed across the Mississippi River, but with the proviso that federal judicial

and legislative power over navigable waters, interstate commerce, and federal
taxation were not adversely affected (Petty v. Tennessee-Missouri Bridge Comm'n

[1959]). While the Petty case illustrates Congress's power over compacts it also
highlights the difference between a traditional interstate compact (even of the
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modern administrative entity variety) and the proposed NPV. The bridge
commission upheld in Petty had the potential—absent the conditions attached by

Congress—to interfere with powers granted to Congress under Article I. By

contrast, the NPV compact would change the Electoral College, which was
established not under federal governmental authority pursuant to Article I, Section
8, but under constitutional authority.

The Court's concern in Virginia v. Tennessee (1893) about protecting
congressional enactments from "encroachment" by interstate compacts would
apply to fundamental constitutional institutions, which are superior to congres
sional enactments under the Supremacy Clause. As John Marshall noted in Barron

v. Baltimore (1833), an interstate compact made for "political purposes... can
scarcely fail to interfere with the general purpose and intent of the constitution
[sic]." By definition and the intention of its supporters, the NPV "encroach[es]...
upon the full and free exercise of federal authority" of the presidential election
system. That is, after all, the NPV's raison d'être: to fundamentally reform national

politics through altering the Electoral College, which proponents view as defective

and unjust (Koza et al. 2013).
The Court has acknowledged, "[t]he electoral college [sic] was designed by men
who did not want the election of the President to be left to the people" ( Gray v.
Sanders [1963]). The Court has also noted that fear of an ignorant and uneducated

citizenry "motivated the Framers' decision not to provide for direct popular
election of the President" (Anderson v. Celebrezze [1983]), and has recognized the
Framers sought to give states a voice in the election of the president "in proportion

to their population" (Myers v. United States [1926]). These motives combine to
form an express recognition by the Court of the federal character of the Electoral

College and its state-oriented design. They also highlight how the proposed NPV

would fundamentally alter that character, turning what is a constitutionally
mandated, state-oriented institution into an institution of popular sovereignty,
subject to alteration by a minority of states acting collectively. Again, whether this

is a wise reform is an entirely different question than whether congressional
approval under the Compact Clause is required.
There does not appear to have been any scholarly work that has counted the
number of interstate compacts implemented without Congress's consent. However,

there is data on compacts to which Congress has consented. As of 1925, Felix
Frankfurter and James M. Landis tallied thirty-two compacts to which Congress

had consented, and "[a]ll but seven established state boundaries." As noted above,

Congress has approved 176 interstate compacts, although not all of these are
currently active (Zimmerman 2012). Since Virginia v. Tennessee (1893), the Court
has upheld multiple interstate compacts lacking congressional approval.

Yet, in none of those cases did the compact affect, much less threaten, a
constitutional institution. For example, in 1978 the Supreme Court reviewed a
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compact between nineteen states to establish a "Multistate Tax Commission,"
which would make tax collection on multistate businesses uniform among the
member states and avoid duplicative taxation. The Supreme Court upheld the
compact, notwithstanding the lack of congressional approval, because the member
states' power was not an "enhancement of state power at the expense of the federal
supremacy." Nevertheless, the test of whether federal supremacy has been burdened

is "potential," rather than actual, interference (United States Steel Corp. v.
Multistate Tax Comm'n [1978] [hereinafter U.S. Steel]).
Additionally, changes to the federal structure of the Union are in the vein of
threats to federal supremacy that so concerned the Court in Virginia v. Tennessee

(1893). The majority in U.S. Steel entertained the possibility that burdens upon

nonmember states could require congressional approval if a "threat to the
sovereignty of other States" exists or the compact affects "the Federal structure"
{U.S. Steel [1978]). The nineteen states that had joined the compact for the purpose

of tax uniformity did not implicate the federal structure; rather, they were
concerned with the collection of state-based taxes. By contrast, the NPV compact is
expressly intended to alter not merely a federal structure, but a constitutionally
mandated federal structure.

Michael Brody, a NPV supporter, has contended that the Court in U.S. Steel
effectively dismissed NPV opponents' concerns about threats to federal supremacy
in footnote 33 of the majority opinion (Brody 2013). In that footnote, the majority
noted that, "every state cooperative action touching interstate or foreign commerce

implicates some federal interest" (U.S. Steel [1978]). Brody claims that, "if a
compact implicates a federal interest, it does not necessarily follow that federal
supremacy has also been implicated" (Brody 2013). Standing alone, this statement
may be true, but the Court in U.S. Steel was concerned with whether the federal
interest regarding commerce invoked by multistate taxation was a threat to federal

supremacy. The Court held it was not. In same footnote the Court expressly
confirmed that the Compact Clause's standard is whether federal supremacy is
threatened by an "encroachment or interference through enhanced state power"
(U.S. Steel [1978]). The NPV is clearly a threat to federal supremacy since it would

replace a federal institution established by the Constitution with a popular vote
system. U.S. Steel is a precedent that reaffirms the federalism concerns the Court
has voiced regarding interstate agreements since the late nineteenth century.
Another point of distinction regarding the U.S. Steel case is that the Court noted

the importance of the member states' ability to "withdraw at any time" from the

compact (U.S. Steel [1978]). The terms of the NPV plan do not allow states to
withdraw "at any time." Rather, the NPV plan prohibits withdrawal within six
months of the end of the president's term (National Popular Vote). Vikram David

Amar has tentatively suggested the Necessary and Proper Clause might allow
Congress to create uniform withdrawal rules for states joining the NPV. Amar's
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suggestion depends upon the Court construing the Compact Clause as a grant of

power to Congress and a correlative construction of the Necessary and Proper
Clause as a basis for enacting withdrawal rules, which purportedly effectuate the

Compact Clause's approval "power" (Amar 2011). Although compacts are treated

as contracts enforceable by federal courts (West Virginia ex rel. Dyer v. Sims
[1951]), it is doubtful, as Norman Williams has ably demonstrated, that Congress

or the federal courts could prohibit states from withdrawing at any time, since
states' constitutional power to select the manner of appointing electors is "plenary"
(Williams 2011, citing McPherson v. Blacker [1892]). Nevertheless, such hypothet
ical federal withdrawal rules (aside from the question of their federal enforceability)

would not reduce the disadvantages to nonmember states.
Horizontal Federalism Concerns

Several authors have concluded that the U.S. Steel case greatly reduces the scope of
the Compact Clause, especially in regard to "horizontal federalism," which is the
area of state powers and relationships with other states within the federal system
(Pincus 2009). These authors point to Justice Byron White's dissent in U.S. Steel, in
which he advocated a test that regarded the interests of noncompact states. Justice

White argued that Congress must be "consulted" as "the proper body to evaluate

the extent of harm being imposed on non-Compact States" (U.S. Steel [1978]).
Justice White's dissent was cited with approval three years later by a majority of the

Court in Cuyler v. Adams (1981).
In Cuyler, the Court held two compacts—the Interstate Agreement on Detainers
and the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act, both of which concerned interstate
transfers of criminal defendants—had obtained congressional pre-approval from a

prior federal law on the subject (Cuyler v. Adams [1981]). The majority opinion,
citing Virginia v. Tennessee (1893), reaffirmed that a compact needs congressional

approval if it creates greater political power in the member states and thereby
threatens federal supremacy. The Court stated, "the Framers sought to ensure that
Congress would maintain ultimate supervisory power over cooperative state action
that might otherwise interfere with the full and free exercise of federal authority"

(Cuyler v. Adams [1981]). Importantly, in footnote 8, the Cuyler majority quoted

with approval Justice White's dissent in U.S. Steel, wherein he noted that
disadvantages to nonmember states must be considered. Cuyler provides support for
an argument that Congress must be given the opportunity to determine the character

of the NPV. Also, the Cuyler majority's favorable reference to Justice White's
horizontal federalism concerns in his U.S. Steel dissent strongly suggests the Court
may be favorably disposed to considering not only whether the NPV threatens federal

supremacy, but also whether the interests and powers of nonmember states are

threatened. The NPV would clearly elevate importance of big urban centers and
diminish that of small states and rural regions (Von Spakovsky 2011). The NPV
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threatens federal supremacy by overturning the Constitution's presidential election
system and increasing the power of large-population states, or states with large urban

areas, at the expense of small-population states. Accordingly, the NPV would negate
national presidential campaigns, an original purpose of the Electoral College, and

encourage big city-centric campaigns. The anticipated urbanization of campaigns

under the NPV and the Court's respect for horizontal federalism supports the
contention that the NPV should be submitted to Congress.

What of the States' "Plenary Power"?

A final issue exists regarding the power of states to act without congressional
approval. Since the late nineteenth century, the Supreme Court has held that the

states possess a "plenary power to prescribe the method of choosing electors"
(McPherson v. Blacker [1892]). NPV proponents contend the states' plenary power

allows them to avoid submitting the NPV compact to Congress (Koza et al. 2013).
Although the states individually have great latitude in choosing electors, the NPV

proponents have chosen a specific constitutional tool for change: the interstate
compact. Again, as Justice Field noted in Virginia v. Tennessee (1893), the issue
regarding a compact is whether it threatens federal supremacy. The plenary power

of individual states does not allow a collective end run around the congressional
consent requirement of the Compact Clause.
At this point, it would appear that the NPV proponents simply need to proceed
with advocating the enactment of the NPV in various states and engage in lobbying
Congress for eventual approval of the compact, which can be granted either before
or after the requisite states have enacted the law and triggered its implementation.
The best political-cum-legal advice would probably be to submit the NPV compact

to Congress after the NPV compact has been enacted in the requisite number of
states, thereby demonstrating a degree of state legislative support for the compact.

Regardless of the timing of submission, it appears that, contrary to the current

position of NPV proponents, the NPV interstate compact must be submitted to
Congress in order to be constitutionally enacted and implemented. However, as will
be discussed below, there is an even greater barrier to the realization of the NPV.
Although it is my contention that the NPV must be submitted to Congress in order

to comply with the Compact Clause of the Constitution, it is extremely doubtful

that Congress could constitutionally approve the NPV because such approval
would, in itself, be an unconstitutional act by Congress.

The Insurmountable Barrier?—The "Law of the Union" Doctrine
In Cuyler v. Adams (1981) case, the Supreme Court reaffirmed an additional
and, in the case of the NPV, potentially decisive constitutional rule: the "law of

the Union" doctrine. In Cuyler the Court noted that congressional approval of
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an interstate compact "transforms an interstate compact within [the Compact]

Clause into a law of the United States." The interstate compact in Cuyler had
congressional approval and the Court noted the applicability of the "law of the

Union" doctrine, stating: "One consequence of this metamorphosis [i.e.,
congressional approval] is that, unless the compact to which Congress has con
sented is somehow unconstitutional, no court may order relief inconsistent with

its express terms" (Texas v. New Mexico [1983]). As stated in footnote 7 of the
majority opinion, the law of the Union doctrine specifically creates a federal
question for purposes of federal subject matter jurisdiction. This jurisdictional
foundation is justified by an "underlying principle that congressional consent can
transform interstate compacts into federal law" (Cuyler v. Adams [1983]; Texas v.

New Mexico [1983]; New Jersey v. New York [1998]). Once Congress consents,
"[t]he agreement is a congressionally sanctioned interstate compact within the

Compact Clause and thus is a federal law subject to federal constructions"
(Carchman v. Nash [1985]; Alabama v. Bozeman [2001]). As Joseph F. Zimmerman
has correctly concluded, Cuyler "replaced the precedent [i.e., U.S. Steel] that only

concordats [interstate compacts] encroaching on the powers of the federal
government came under the interstate compact clause of the United States
Constitution. The Cuyler Decision [sic] means any interstate agreement consented

to by Congress automatically is covered by the [Compact] clause" (Zimmerman
2012).
As noted in Cuyler, the Court originally articulated the "law of the Union"
doctrine in an 1852 case. In Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co. (1852)

the state of Pennsylvania sued a private bridge owner in Ohio, claiming the
erection of a bridge across the Ohio River was a nuisance that interfered with
interstate commerce on the river. In 1789, Virginia passed a law proposing the state
of Kentucky and particularly stipulating that the Ohio River would remain free for

navigation by all U.S. citizens. The Supreme Court construed this law as a compact

within the meaning of the Compact Clause of the Constitution. The bridge
company claimed that no federal law had been enacted regulating constructions

across the river; therefore, the bridge should have been allowed to remain.
However, the Supreme Court rejected this argument by referring to Congress's
approval of the Virginia-Kentucky compact as federal law on the subject matter.
The Court held the "compact, by the sanction of Congress, has become a law of the

Union" (Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Company [1852]).
In 1981, the Cuyler Court explained that the "law of the Union" doctrine was
consistent with the Framers' intent because the Compact Clause's requirement of

congressional consent "ensure[d] that Congress would maintain ultimate
supervisory power over cooperative state action that might otherwise interfere
with the full and free exercise of federal authority" (Cuyler v. Adams [1981] [citing

Frankfurter and Landis 1925]). The Court's concerns about states "encroaching"
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upon federal power, originally voiced by Joseph Story in his Commentaries,
published the 1830s, and elevated to constitutional doctrine in Virginia v. Tennessee

(1893), have been supported by holdings that Congress can reject compacts

submitted to it and can conditionally approve compacts (James v. Dravo
Contracting Company [1937]). As the Court has stated, "Congress must exercise
national supervision through its power to grant or withhold consent, or to grant it
under appropriate conditions."

Under the Compact Clause, the Framers "allowed interstate adjustments but

duly safeguarded the national interest" (Petty v. Tennessee-Missouri Bridge
Commission [1959], quoting Frankfurter and Landis 1925). Accordingly, congres
sional approval is a transformative event. Not only does congressional approval vest
federal courts with subject matter jurisdiction; more importantly for the purpose of

reviewing the NPV, but it also converts the compact to a federal law ( Wedding v.
Meyler [1904]; Delaware River Joint Toll Bridge Commission v. Colburn [1940]; Petty

v. Tennessee-Missouri Bridge Commission [1959]; Cuyler v. Adams [1981]).
The Law of the Union as Applied to the NPV

In light of the "law of the Union" doctrine, the pertinent question is whether
Congress has the constitutional authority to approve the NPV. It is my contention
that Congress can only approve an interstate compact (thereby making federal law
under the "law of the Union" doctrine) if Congress already possesses the power to

enact the agreement on its own initiative under the Article I, Section 8 powers
granted to Congress, or another specific constitutional provision delegating such

power to Congress, or if the terms of the compact are not otherwise
unconstitutional.2 As noted above, the Supreme Court has given support to this
view, describing the "metamorphosis" as binding upon the federal courts "unless"

the compact to which Congress has consented is "somehow unconstitutional"
(Texas v. New Mexico [1983]; New Jersey v. New York [1998]).
That caveat regarding constitutionality is key for understanding the power of
Congress regarding interstate compacts. As with all questions regarding state power

and federal governmental power, the Supremacy Clause of Article VI plays an

important, often decisive, role. In the context of the Compact Clause, the
Supremacy Clause is the foundation for determining whether a compact must be

submitted to Congress for approval. In Cuyler v. Adams [1981] the Court noted
that only compacts which may "interfere with the just supremacy of the United

States" need to be submitted to Congress. Also, under the "law of the Union"
doctrine any congressional action is federal in character, which gives rise to Article

III jurisdiction (Broun et al. 2006, citing League to Save Lake Tahoe v. Tahoe
Regional Planning Agency [1974]). "[A]ny [legal] rights or obligations granted by a
congressionally sanctioned interstate compact are federal, not state, in character"

(Broun et al. 2006, citing Bush v. Muncy [1981]). However, not only is a compact
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sanctioned by Congress converted into federal law, subject to all constitutional

restrictions upon federal law, but the actions of Congress are also subject to
constitutional restrictions. That is, the Supremacy Clause limits Congress's power

to only those actions allowed under the Constitution (United States v. Germaine

[1870]). This includes Congress's power acting pursuant to the Compact Clause.
Two points are essential in understanding whether Congress has the power to

approve the NPV. First, as noted above, the Electoral College is an institution
created by the Constitution. As such, under the Supremacy Clause of Article VI any

federal statute contrary to a constitutional provision is unconstitutional. Any
congressional approval of a system that makes the election of the president—which
is a separate branch of the federal government—an election determined by national

popular vote is an alteration of the federal character of the Electoral College as
established by the Constitution. Just as the states are prohibited from altering this
uniquely federal institution, so too is Congress.
Second, Article II, Section 1, Clause 2 of the Constitution grants the states the

power over the "Manner" of the appointment of presidential electors, while
restricting the role of Congress. As Article II, Section 1 states and the Supreme

Court has confirmed, Congress's constitutional power regarding presidential
electors is limited to determining the time when electors are chosen and the date

when they must vote for president (McPherson v. Blacker [1892]). Otherwise,
Congress lacks any constitutional power to alter the Electoral College or the states'
systems for allocating their electoral votes. The Court has long recognized that the
Constitution assigns the "appointment and mode of appointment of electors.. .ex
clusively to the States" (McPherson v. Blacker [1892]).
The question of whether the states can combine through an interstate compact

to alter the Electoral College is not a question of "states' rights." Article II's
assignment of the power to select electors to the states is not a recognition of
preexisting state power; rather, as the Supreme Court has held, it is a "direct grant
of authority" under Article II (Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. [2000];

Walker v. U.S. [1937]; Fitzgerald v. Green [1890]). That is, both the states and

Congress are empowered by Article II to take specific actions regarding the
implementing of the Electoral College, but neither is authorized to fundamentally
alter the Electoral College's structure or purpose. As the Third Circuit has held, in
addition to the Cuyler holding that congressional consent transforms the compact

into a "law of the Union," the "subject matter" of the compact must be
"appropriate for congressional legislation" (Doe v. Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation

and Parole [2008]). Accordingly, Congress lacks any express or implied power
under Articles I or II to enact a statute altering the Electoral College. Additionally,
there is no case law supporting the proposition that Congress can enact into law a

compact that would accomplish a goal for which Congress otherwise lacks
constitutional power.
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It must be remembered that the Framers intended for the Compact Clause to
afford Congress a gatekeeper role over interstate collective action. Writing in 1925,

Felix Frankfurter and James M. Landis argued that the Framers had "practical
objectives" in requiring Congress's review of interstate compacts. They noted the
Framers' intent regarding interstate compacts was that:

Congress must exercise national supervision through its power to grant or
withhold consent, or to grant it under appropriate conditions. The framers

thus astutely created a mechanism of legal control over affairs that are
projected beyond State lines and yet may not call for, nor be capable of,
national treatment. They allowed interstate adjustments but duly safeguarded
the national interest (Frankfurter and Landis 1925).
The foregoing demonstrates how ill suited the NPV compact is to the functions

of Congress under the Compact Clause. Article II, Section 1 prevents Congress
from playing any "supervisory" role or exercising any "legal control" over the
states or the Electoral College, other than setting the time when electors are chosen

and the date when they must vote for president (McPherson v. Blacker [1892]).

Under the Compact Clause Congress has been allowed by the federal courts to
attach conditions to its consent, as exampled above in the Petty case regarding the
bridge commission, but those conditions must be constitutional ( Tobin v. United
States [1962]). As Zimmerman and Wendell have noted, "The basic purpose of the

constitutional requirement of Congressional consent is to make certain that no
such agreements can stand against the will of Congress" (Broun et al. 2006, quoting
Zimmerman and Wendell 1976). Yet, Congress can have no "will" in regard to the
Electoral College because it lacks any constitutional power over the institution.

A "Political Question"?

As the Supreme Court has recently stated: "In general, the Judiciary has a
responsibility to decide cases properly before it, even those it 'would gladly avoid' "
(Zivotofsky v. Clinton [2012], quoting Cohens v. Virginia [1821]). However, there is

what the Court in Zivotofsky referred to as a "narrow exception" to this
responsibility: the "political question" doctrine. In Baker v. Can (1962), the
Supreme Court gave definition to the "political question" doctrine. This doctrine,

premised upon the separation of powers and depending upon context, either
prohibits or counsels against judicial review of a dispute (Barkow 2002). In light of
the institutional roles of the states, Congress, and the Court in the question of the

NPV, it is possible that the Court could decide the NPV presents a political
question. However, it is unlikely the Court would avoid deciding such a case.
After Baker was decided the Court has rarely avoided deciding a case on political
question grounds (Barkow 2002). As the Court recently stated, "No policy underlying
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the political question doctrine suggests that Congress or the Executive... can decide
the constitutionality of a statute; that is a decision for the courts" (Zivotofsky v. Clinton

[2012], quoting INS v. Chada, [1983]). Any congressional approval of the NP V would
take the form of a federal statute, which the Court could review. Also, none of the
Baker justiciability tests are met by the NPV.

The Baker court provided the following six instances when the political question
doctrine applies:
[When there is a] [1] textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the
issue to a coordinate political department; [2] or a lack of judicially discoverable

and manageable standards for resolving it; [3] or the impossibility of deciding

without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial
discretion; [4] or the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent
resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of
government; [5] or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political

decision already made; [6] or the potentiality of embarrassment from
multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question.
First, the Constitution does not "commit" the question of the NPV to Congress.
Although Congress supervises state compacts under the Compact Clause, the legal

issue of whether the Compact Clause, Article II, Section 1, Clause 2, and the
Supremacy Clause allow the NPV to be approved is a question of Congress's
constitutional power. The Court has not been reluctant to adjudge the power of
Congress under the Constitution. Second, the Court has established "standards" for
resolving this issue. In the late nineteenth century the Court set rules for when the

states must submit a compact to Congress (Virginia v. Tennessee [1893]). Also, the

Court has recognized the "law of the Union" doctrine, which not only describes
the effect of congressional approval of a compact but also conditions such approval

on the constitutionality of the compact (Texas v. New Mexico [1983]).
In regard to the four remaining Baker "formulations," any review of the NPV by the

Court would be a proper response to the Court's constitutional responsibility to
decide whether Congress has acted constitutionally, would not involve "disrespect" to
the states or Congress, or the need to "adhere" to a foregone political decision, or the

"embarrassment" of multiple pronouncements from the federal government on the
issue. In short, it is highly unlikely that the political question doctrine will restrict
the Court from ruling on the need for the states' submission of the NPV compact to

Congress or Congress's power to approve the NPV.

Application to Other Interstate Compacts?

In light of the NPV compact and the opinions stated herein regarding its
constitutional propriety, the question of the application of these opinions to
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existing and future interstate compacts should be noted. Only a minority of
interstate compacts lack congressional approval. The Court's clear standards for the
types of compacts that must be submitted to Congress will allow for judicial review
of those not submitted. Also, with the exception of the NPV, all known interstate

compacts appear to be well within the ambit of Congress's power to approve. If

Congress were to approve the NPV and the Supreme Court were to hold
Congress's approval unconstitutional, it is certainly possible that the language of
the decision could allow for challenges to existing compacts. However, it is difficult
to envision what challenges would be allowed to existing compacts, since the NPV

is unique.
Although it is impossible to predict the future, any Court decision on Congress's

power to approve the NPV would likely be an unusual case probably not readily
applicable to other congressional approvals of interstate compacts. The possibility

of the Court upholding Congress's approval of the NPV would be a potential
watershed decision regarding interstate power. The reasoning supporting such a

decision would be critical to evaluating its precedential importance. Yet, it is
possible at this point to suggest that if Congress can sanction a fundamental
alteration of the Electoral College, then interstate compacts could become very
powerful instruments of not merely interstate cooperation, but interstate-initiated
constitutional change.

Conclusion
It is likely that if and when the requisite number of states has enacted the NPV

compact there will be multiple suits filed in state and federal courts seeking
injunctions against states' implementation of the compact. These suits may have
different outcomes in the respective state and federal courts in which they are filed

and perhaps even in the state supreme courts and federal intermediate appellate
courts that will hear the initial appeals. If conflicting holdings result among the

federal circuit courts of appeal, then the U.S. Supreme Court would almost
certainly hear the case in order to resolve a conflict among the circuit courts. Even
if no conflict among the circuits developed, the importance of the constitutional
question might spur the Court to review the issue. In short, it is likely that the

Supreme Court will be involved in any resolution of the constitutional issues
surrounding the NPV. In light of the Court's jurisprudence on interstate compacts,
it will likely play a central role in determining whether the NPV interstate compact
becomes the law of the land.

The NPV compact presents an apparent catch-22 problem for its proponents:

The states must submit the NPV to Congress for approval, but Congress is
constitutionally constrained from granting approval. These two claims might
appear contradictory but are in fact necessary legal issues that must be addressed in
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sequence. Whether the states must submit the NPV compact to Congress is a legal

question that is raised begged by the NPV proponents and opponents' stipulation
that the NPV is an interstate compact. The proponents have argued that Supreme

Court precedents interpreting the Compact Clause allow this compact to avoid
being submitted to Congress for approval. Accordingly, any assessment of the
NPV's constitutionality must begin with addressing this initial claim by the NPV

proponents. It is my conclusion that the NPV interstate compact must be
submitted to Congress under the terms of the Compact Clause and Supreme Court
precedents.

Then a second question arises: Is this a compact Congress can approve? This
inquiry also requires a review of Supreme Court precedents. It is my conclusion

that the "law of the Union" doctrine and the constitutional restrictions upon
Congress's power regarding the states' appointment of electors prohibit Congress

from approving this compact. The NPV is unique in that it directly seeks to
fundamentally alter a constitutional institution. Neither Congress nor the states can

use the Compact Clause as a backdoor method of amending the Constitution to
change the Electoral College system. Ultimately, NPV proponents can resolve this
dilemma by abandoning the interstate compact route and adhering to the Article V
amendment process. Only a constitutional amendment will enable the shift from

the Electoral College's state-based system to a national popular vote system for
electing the president.

Notes
1. Only Nebraska and Maine allocate their electoral votes on a proportional basis, wherein
votes are awarded to the popular vote winner in each congressional district.

2. Vikram David Amar, an NPV proponent, has made a similar point regarding whether

the Necessary and Proper Clause might serve as a basis for Congress to approve the
NPV. Amar notes, "the fact that some group of compacting states (which could be as
few as two) might agree to something should not give Congress power that otherwise
falls beyond its enumerated authority to impose on unwilling states" (Amar 2011).
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